

## Message Text

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ACTION OES-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDA-12 CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-13  
L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 EB-08 NRC-05 SOE-02 DODE-00  
DOE-15 SS-15 SP-02 CEQ-01 PM-05 SAS-02 /120 W  
-----092357 121905Z /73

R 121805Z SEP 78  
FM AMEMBASSY BONN  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1800  
INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 16699

EMBASSY ALSO FOR EC BRUSSELS AND IAEA

E. O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, GW  
SUBJECT: IAEA SAFEGUARDS CONSULTATIONS

1. DURING THREE-HOUR MEETING MORNING OF 11 SEPTEMBER, BORIGHT (OES), HOUCK (ACDA), FRIEDMAN AND LIMPRECHT OF EMBASSY DISCUSSED IAEA SAFEGUARDS WITH FRG OFFICIALS LOOSCH, ROUGET, VON OSTEN, BOULANGER, PATERMANN, WAGNER AND GANSAUER IN PREPARATION FOR IAEA BOARD MEETING. TWO MAIN SUBJECTS WERE THE SIR AND THE EURATOM IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS, SUBJECTS THAT ARE VERY CLOSELY RELATED, ESPECIALLY IN THE FRG VIEW. DISCUSSIONS WERE CONTINUED DURING LUNCH WITH PATERMANN AND WAGNER BUT WITHOUT LOOSCH, ROUGET AND FRIEDMAN.

2. WITH RESPECT TO THE SIR, LOOSCH WAS CONCERNED WITH WHAT KIND OF BOARD ACTION IS INVOLVED. LOOSCH IS PREPARED, AS REQUESTED BY THE DG, TO TAKE NOTE OF THE FACTS OF IMPLEMENTATIONS AND OF CERTAIN OF THE ANNOUNCED INTENTIONS OF THE SECRETARIAT FOR THE FUTURE, E.G., IMPROVED SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT. HE IS, HOWEVER, CONFIDENTIAL

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VERY CONCERNED THAT TAKING NOTE BY THE BOARD OF THE SECRETARIAT'S PLANNED USE OF QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA WILL BE USED LATER BY THE SECRETARIAT TO ARGUE THAT THE BOARD HAS ACCEPTED THESE CRITERIA AS REQUIREMENTS. LOOSCH PLANS TO INCLUDE IN HIS BOARD STATEMENT SOME STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT TAKING NOTE OF SIR IS NOT AN ENDORSEMENT OF ALL OF ITS CONTENTS. HE WILL NOT

ASK FOR ANY SPECIFIC REVIEW, IN BOARD OR ELSEWHERE, OF THESE GOALS. THE US SIDE STRESSED THAT WE VIEWED THESE CRITERIA AS LONG TERM GOALS AND NOT RIGID REQUIREMENTS. WE AGREED THAT THE DEGREE TO WHICH GOALS COULD BE ACHIEVED, AND THE PROCEDURES FOR THEIR ACHIEVEMENT, HAD TO BE EXAMINED SEPARATELY FOR EACH FACILITY.

3. A LARGE PART OF THE DISCUSSION DEALT WITH THE QUANTITATIVE CRITERIA FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS, PARTICULARLY DETECTION TIMES FOR PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE FRG IS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PARTICULAR VALUES IN THE SIR AND THE GENERAL APPROACH OF SETTING VALUES. THEY ADMIT, HOWEVER, TO HAVING NO ALTERNATIVE TO SOME KIND OF QUANTIFICATION. THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE CRITERIA BASED IN PART ON POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, SUCH AS THE SIZE OF A STATE AND WHAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A CREDIBLE NUCLEAR WEAPON PROGRAM FOR A STATE. THEY DID NOT OFFER ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR THE SECRETARIAT TO MAKE JUDGMENTS ON SUCH FACTORS, (AND THAT SOME SUCH FACTORS COULD GO IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.) THEY ALSO ARE LOOKING FOR SOME APPROACH WHEREBY CREDIT IS GIVEN FOR MULTINATIONAL CHARACTER OF EURATOM BUT AGAIN HAVE NO PROPOSAL FOR SIMULTANEOUSLY ACCOMPLISHING THIS AND AVOIDING A BAD PRECEDENT FOR SAFEGUARDS.

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4. THEY WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A GREATER ROLE IN ESTABLISHING IAEA SAFEGUARDS GOALS BUT ADMIT THAT THE HEAVY WORKLOAD OF ALL INTERESTED PARTIES HAS BEEN A LIMITING FACTOR SO FAR. THEY AGREE THAT THE BOARD IS NOT A GOOD FORUM FOR TRYING TO SELECT CRITERIA. THEY FEEL SAGSI HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL IN THIS REGARD SO FAR AND THUS ARE INTERESTED IN EXPLORING NEW FORA. VON OSTEN WANTS TO RESTRICT THE DISCUSSION TO STATES THAT ARE LEGITIMATELY INTERESTED IN THE CRITERIA, WHICH IN HIS VIEW DOES NOT INCLUDE THE DEVELOPING STATES OR THE SOVIET BLOC STATES. WE POINTED OUT THAT IT WOULD BE POLITICALLY DIFFICULT FOR THE IAEA TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH SUCH RESTRICTED MEETINGS AND THAT, IF CONDUCTED OUTSIDE THE IAEA, COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IF THE MEETINGS BECAME GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. WE AGREED THAT LESS FORMAL, PERHAPS JUST BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

5. LOOSCH AT SEVERAL TIMES EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT SOME OF THE STATEMENTS IN THE SIR AND SOME OF THE THINGS

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1801

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 16699

THE SECRETARIAT WAS SEEKING IN EURATOM FACILITY ATTACHMENTS WENT BEYOND THE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS. HE WAS VAGUE WHEN ASKED FOR SPECIFICS. HE AGREED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IDEA TO SUGGEST CHANGES IN OR ANY REOPENING OF INFCIRC/153 AT THIS TIME. MUCH OF THE FRG CONCERN ON THIS POINT RELATES TO THE PROVISION IN THE EURATOM/IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT (INFCIRC/193, PROTOCOL ARTICLE 14) FOR IAEA VERIFICATION TO BE ACHIEVED THROUGH OBSERVATION OF EURATOM. THIS IS AS MUCH A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE AS OF ACTUAL IMPACT ON FACILITY OPERATORS OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS ACTIVITIES. MAN-DAYS OF INSPECTION ARE ALSO INVOLVED BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF FRG-PARLIAMENT TO WHAT COULD BE SEEN AS DOUBLE INSPECTIONS BY EURATOM AND BY IAEA.

6. THE ISSUE OF OBSERVATION COMES TO THE FORE FOR THE LOW ENRICHED FUEL FABRICATION FACILITIES WHICH IS WHERE THE FRG SAYS THEY MUST DRAW THE LINE. IT IS NOT, HOWEVER, A NEW ISSUE. IT CAME UP IN THE FACILITY ATTACHMENTS FOR LWR'S. THE 12 LWR FA'S  
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EMBODY IN PRINCIPLE THE CONCEPT, ALTHOUGH IN PRACTICE NO ONE HAS BEEN ABLE TO SPECIFY HOW THE IAEA WOULD ACHIEVE INDEPENDENCE THROUGH OBSERVING EURATOM INSPECTIONS. THE CONCEPT WAS OMITTED FOR MOST RESEARCH REACTORS, BECAUSE IT DIDN'T SEEM IMPORTANT. THE CONCEPT IS ALSO OMITTED FOR PLUTONIUM AND HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FACILITIES WHERE THE JOINT TEAM APPROACH IS AGREED, BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVE NATURE OF SUCH FACILITIES.

7. A FURTHER PROBLEM RELATES TO QUESTION OF COSTS OF SAFEGUARDS, PURSUANT TO PARA 15A OF INFCIRC/153. LOOSCH SAYS IAEA HAS NO PLAN OR GUIDELINES, AND THEREFORE FRG SIMPLY WANTS TO INSERT QUOTE FROM INFCIRC/153. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY ONLY REMAINING PROBLEM FOR FACILITY ATTACHMENT FOR NUKEM.

8. ACCORDING TO LOOSCH, EACH FACILITY ATTACHMENT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS IT IS COMPLETED. HE FELT THAT MOST FACILITY ATTACHMENTS COULD BE FINISHED BY THE END OF THE YEAR. A FEW SPECIAL ONES, SUCH AS THE NUCLEAR POWERED SHIP (OTTO HAHN) AND THE ALMELO FACILITY ATTACHMENT WOULD NOT BE FINISHED THIS YEAR AND HE DECLINED TO ESTIMATE WHEN IT WOULD BE.  
MEEHAN

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## Message Attributes

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